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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

SETTLING MUD, RUNNING STREAMS, AND
“THE WHOLE THING ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN”:
SUBVERTING CLASSICAL DISCOURSE AND THE ROLE OF
CHARACTER IN GERTRUDE STEIN’S “MELANCTHA”
The thesis begins by exploring Stein’s autobiographical connections to the
Jamesian concepts of bottom nature and habit, in an attempt to demonstrate that both, in
the pen of Gertrude Stein, are as connected to classical virtue theory and the development
of character as a moral state and characters as created persons within her creative oeuvre,
as they are connected to psychological experiments in William James’ laboratory. In
wading through what may seem to be muddy waters of Stein’s slippery definitions and
circular sentences, the thesis shows that Stein uses the discourse of classical virtue theory
to achieve her goal—breaking down clear barriers to the virtuous life as classically
understood and subverting the very building blocks of Western thought generally. Lastly,
“Melanctha: Each One As She May” will become a case study through which the thesis
wrestles in detail with Stein’s complicated virtue and character project as she pulls
virtuous action into a separate sphere from the virtuous person in order to explore what
human nature is, or, as she says, “the whole thing about men and women that is
interesting.”
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Chapter 1: Introduction
My writing is clear as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and
disappear, perhaps that is the reason but really there is no reason that the
earth is round and that no one knows the limits of the universe that is the
whole thing about men and women that is interesting.
Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography
Books about Gertrude Stein’s life and works often steal her quirkily articulated
clear-as-mud quote for their epigraphs—at least the first sixteen words: “My writing is
clear as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and disappear” (Everybody’s
Autobiography 126).
And certainly to many casual and critical readers alike, Stein’s writing does seem
“clear as mud.” Richard Bridgeman characterizes it as an “unruly mélange” (xvi),
difficult to sift through and in which to find coherence. Yet the name Gertrude Stein
continues to be recognizable to many average readers outside academic circles, even
today. Certainly she was a celebrity of sorts in her own day; The Autobiography of Alice
B. Toklas introduced Americans to a celebrity culture—the artists, writers, and other
creative types—that surrounded Stein in Paris in the early twentieth century. Stein
lectured widely and was sought out by young American writers such as Hemingway and
Fitzgerald—names never left out of even the most rudimentary of textbook canons. Some
critics credit Gertrude Stein and her brother Leo with the early success of modernist
painters such as Picasso and Matisse, also household names. And yet apart from The
Autobiography, in which Stein writes of herself in the third person, her own written work,
which includes fiction, essays, character sketches, plays, and poems, was not widely read
during her lifetime, nor is it popularly read today outside of the classroom.
Indeed, it often seems as if Stein’s celebrity-status fame and the obliqueness of
her literary work are contradictory. Consider that Gertrude Stein shows up as the
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character in Woody Allen’s 2011 film Midnight in Paris—a character who offers pivotal
writing advice to Allen’s author-protagonist, advice that brings both his writing and
romantic crises and the film itself to a resolution—yet an English graduate student once
told me he would rather gouge out his eyes than read a page of Stein’s work. What is it
about Gertrude Stein that has so captivated and yet so frustrated readers attempting to
delve into her work?
Consider Bridgeman’s confession in his introduction to Gertrude Stein in Pieces:
“When I originally undertook a systematic reading of Gertrude Stein, it was in the
expectation of learning how to decipher even the most resistant of her works. That
particularly naïve assumption has long since been dispelled. Still, the surest way to begin
understanding this unruly mélange is to familiarize oneself with its actual features” (xvi).
Its “actual features.”
During her lifetime, Stein refused to explain her work in a definitive and didactic
manner, arguing that it stands on its own. Stein “did not understand why since the writing
was all so clear and natural they mocked at and were enraged by her work” (Toklas 35).
Yet even the most accessible of her fiction—certainly Three Lives is the most linear
within each story and the most-often anthologized of her work to appear in undergraduate
American literature textbooks—was received with some scathing reviews. Stein
maintained that the reader who simply reads will understand. Her friend Carl Van
Vechten, in “How to Read Gertrude Stein,” writes, “Miss Stein has no explanation to
offer regarding her work. I have often questioned her, but I have met with no satisfaction.
She asks you to read” (in Curnutt, 155). Everybody’s Autobiography, Stein’s 1937
follow-up to the smashing success of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, has been
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considered by some publishers to be “in fact one of the most direct books Gertrude Stein
ever wrote” (ix). Still, even this praise is tempered: “Direct, but it wouldn’t be Stein if it
weren’t also maddeningly, delightfully oblique,” a drawback that made it
“[p]redictably…a failure” (ix, viii).
Revisiting Stein’s claim that her writing is “clear as mud” sheds some light on the
“actual features” of her work, if we look past those first oft-quoted sixteen words. “My
writing is clear as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and disappear,” she
writes, “perhaps that is the reason but really there is no reason that the earth is round and
that no one knows the limits of the universe that is the whole thing about men and women
that is interesting” (Everybody’s Autobiography 126-27, my emphasis).
By making the beginning portion of this quote stand on its own, we focus on the
clarity of the writing—the streams that can be made to run clear once the mud settles. But
those streams “run on and disappear,” Stein says; they leave no lasting impression.
Still, Stein reminds us, the world is round.
On a round globe, Stein may be suggesting, streams—stories—don’t disappear.
They run on and on and on, and “no one knows the limits of the universe.” This repetition
of story is what makes story interesting, “the whole thing about men and women,” in fact,
“that is interesting” (my emphasis).
It is easy to become scientific in our unpacking of Stein’s oeuvre—counting how
often a word appears, calculating how meanings shift with repetition, tracing how
vocalized sounds change a text’s tone, mapping out a story’s non-linearity to show
Stein’s nuanced counter-story under the surface of an otherwise straightforward narrative.
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Indeed, Stein criticism frequently falls into these habits, which requires a question: why
are readers and critics alike so determined to make the mud run clear?
Instead, what happens if we focus on “the whole thing” that is interesting about
men and women? What if “the whole thing” is the human element of the characters
themselves? In her nonfiction, her fiction, and her autobiographical works, Stein focuses
on people as characters and characters as people, even offering herself as a character of
sorts in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. What if the characters move into the
foreground, rather than the writing itself? What if the words—carefully chosen, indeed,
by Stein, as she has emphasized elsewhere—are the scaffolding on which characters
unfold? And not just character types being developed, but particular characters within her
narratives who are themselves developing character?
A passing reference in Everybody’s Autobiography to “character” offers an
opening to this discussion: “In those comparatively young days… I thought everybody
had a character and I knew it and I liked them to be in character” (4-5). Stein leaves
vague the “when” of these “comparatively young days,” but they have certainly passed
by the time of her lecture tour in the United States in the thirties. Her conception of
“character” here combines both character-as-persona, similar to a character in a play, as if
“all the world’s a stage,” with something more than a role. It is identity fashioned from
what individual people—perhaps other “geniuses” like herself—are able to put on or step
into and also a key part of what it means to be a human being. “I thought everybody had a
character and I knew it” (my emphasis).
The word “character” has roots in the ancient Greek word for the tool used to
chisel a permanent design, a distinctive carving, an impression, perhaps like an author
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chiseling away to shape characters with her text and chiseling out her own role as authorcreator in the process. Absorbed into Latin and French and Middle English, “character”
evolved to incorporate the design, carving, or symbol itself that was being imposed in the
process, and by the mid-1600s began to convey the more figurative senses of “character”
today: features or traits characteristic of moral qualities or constitution, as well as the
concreteness of a character as a persona within a work of literature. And when Stein uses
“character” in this fleeting passage, the weight of this word through the centuries
attempts to pin Stein down to meaning and clarity. Her words, in typical Stein fashion,
resist.
It is particularly the sliver of this slippery concept of “character” related to moral
qualities that interests me and has the potential to lead to a fruitful discussion of Stein’s
understanding of virtue and, I will argue, her subversion of classical definitions. As the
mother of a precocious one year old, the wife of a virtue ethicist whose convictions
hearken to Aristotelian conceptions of virtue, a poet, and the lover of a good book, I
cannot help but acknowledge that questions of character development are a reality in my
everyday life. For me, it is not an intellectual, heady pursuit but a matter of ordinary life
lived out. Does the early fiction of Gertrude Stein and her subversion of classical virtue
theory have something to contribute to this very-real discussion of what it means to grow
into a virtuous human being in the world? It’s a lofty question with a down-to-earth
answer: yes.
Stein studies overlook the connection to classical virtue theory present in Stein’s
early work and instead focus on her connection to psychology through William James.
While fruitful in the past, there’s still something new to be seen through new lenses.
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William James’s psychology, after all, was still part of the discipline of philosophy at
Harvard in the late 1800s, and Stein herself was a philosophy major. Why has Stein
research not mentioned her exposure to Plato’s four virtues delineated in his Republic,
when two of those four make repeated appearances in her early fiction and her
autobiographies? Why, when Aristotle connects virtue to character and habituation, do
scholars skip over Nicomachean Ethics in favor of William James’s work with habits of
attention?
Rather than focusing in on the Jamesian concept of word “associations” or his
habits of attention as we unpack Stein’s use of virtue language—especially specific
cardinal virtue words like “courage” and “wisdom”—a Foucaultian approach opens up
new understandings of Stein’s word project.
In the Discourse on Language Foucault articulates the way a seeming cultural
love of discourse is, in actuality, a fear. And this fear of discourse leads to the attempt “to
master and control the great proliferation of discourse” (228), to rein it in and control it,
to take away that which makes it dangerous. It becomes an insect: this “incessant,
disorderly buzzing of discourse” (229). Of Foucault’s three avenues to analyzing the fear
of discourse: “to question our will to truth; to restore to discourse its character as an
event; to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier” (229), this latter tactic, I will argue,
sounds uncannily like Stein’s project regarding virtue language and moral development
of character. By taking one of the key classical understandings of virtue—in particular
the understanding that there can be no virtue apart from virtuous action, that is, no
character who behaves badly can have character—and subverting it through her own
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narratives, as I will show, Stein’s word-virtue-character project can arguably place her as
a predecessor to Foucault.
I’ll begin by backing up and exploring Stein’s autobiographical connections to the
Jamesian concepts of bottom nature and habit, in an attempt to demonstrate that both, in
the pen of Gertrude Stein, are as connected to classical virtue theory and the development
of character as a moral state and characters as created persons within her creative oeuvre,
as they are connected to psychological experiments in William James’ laboratory. In
wading through what may seem to be muddy waters of Stein’s slippery definitions and
circular sentences, I’ll show that Stein is using the discourse of classical virtue theory to
achieve her goal—breaking down clear barriers to the virtuous life as classically
understood and subverting the very building blocks of western thought generally. What
else is virtue, after all, apart from the foundation of human interaction? Lastly,
“Melanctha: Each One As She May” will become a case study through which I wrestle in
detail with Stein’s complicated virtue and character project as she pulls virtuous action
into a separate sphere from the virtuous person in order to explore what human nature is,
or, as she says, “the whole thing about men and women that is interesting.”
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Chapter 2
Muddy Waters: Stein’s Historical Moment, Philosophy, and the Necessity of Subversion
There is singularly nothing that makes a difference a difference in
beginning and in the middle and in ending except that each generation has
something different at which they are all looking.
Gertrude Stein, “Composition as Explanation” 215
Biographies of the life and work of Gertrude Stein range from the succinct, pursesized, and helpful, like Jane Palatini Bowers’s 1993 Gertrude Stein, part of the Women
Writers Series, to the fragile and disintegrating copy of Donald Sutherland’s 1951
biography hidden away on the library shelf. A novel approach is taken by Rachel Cohen
in A Chance Meeting: Intertwined Lives of American Writers and Artists, 1854-1967:
Cohen describes a brief—and fictional—interaction between James and Stein in order to
capture the essence of their relationship, in order to suggest, as so many full-length
biographies articulate in detail, the long-term effects of Jamesian psychology on the
writing of Stein. Other biographies focus on Stein as a celebrity, and readers, while quite
entertained, might begin to wonder if the purpose of the biography is to explore the work
of Stein or describe her relationships with other famous people. Janet Hobhouse’s
Everybody Who Was Anybody and James Mellow’s Charmed Circle, the titles themselves
emphasizing Stein’s circle of famous friends, achieve both tasks, but these chatty and
accessible biographies do lack a depth of critical engagement with her work. Even so,
Hobhouse, Mellow, and others would be remiss not to mention most of the key terms
associated with Stein: repetition, continuous present, automation, character types, and
consciousness, all often explicitly connected with psychology and the work of William
James. Mellow does offer, however, more information than others about Stein’s years at
Radcliffe, and, in particular, the academic courses and other professors with whom Stein
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would have studied in addition to William James. Still, James—the psychologist and his
work—certainly tends to dominate Steinian critical discourse.
Indeed, it is impossible to write about the influences on Gertrude Stein without
addressing the role of William James, as so many have done. Rosalind Miller, for one,
considers him “the greatest influence” on Stein’s early writing, pointing to his chapters
on “The Stream of Consciousness” and “The Sense of Time” in the 1890 Psychology.
Lisa Ruddick calls James “Stein’s one intellectual father, the person who contributed
most to her first expressions of artistic power” (14). Steven Meyer, who argues for the
influence of Stein’s scientific background—much of which was spent in James’
psychology laboratory—on her compositional techniques and shift from science to
writing, dedicates a third of his monograph to the James-Stein influence.
And the connections are not a stretch. In addition to the academic faculty-student
connection and the scientific connection of automatism experiments done in the
psychology laboratories during Stein’s undergraduate years, which included the
publication of her first article with Leon Solomons, is the connection Gertrude Stein
herself lays out in Lectures in America regarding her developing understanding of
character types being rooted in the psychology laboratory:
While I was at college…[t]hen as I say I became more interested in
psychology, and one of the things I did was testing reactions of the
average college student in a state of normal activity and in the state of
fatigue induced by their examinations. I was supposed to be interested in
their reactions but soon I found that I was not but instead that I was
enormously interested in the types of their characters that is what I even
then thought of as the bottom nature of them, and when in May 1898 I
wrote my half of the report of these experiments I expressed these results
as follows:
In these descriptions it will be readily observed that habits of
attention are reflexes of the complete character of the individual. (137-38)
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I’ll return to the Steinien concept of “character types” and “bottom nature” in a moment,
but what is important here is the connection Stein makes between her increasing interest
in psychology and her growing perceptive readings of people.
Many scholars have spent pages discussing the connection between William
James’s work on habit—habits of attention, in particular—and Stein’s concepts of
“types.” After all, she uses the phrase “habits of attention” here, reportedly in her writeup about the experiments. Without denigrating that analysis, it has become clear to me
that much more can be gleaned from Stein’s perceptive descriptions, her concept of
character types, than merely discussing habit and the role of William James. Still,
according to Stein herself, Stein’s personal interest during her undergraduate years was
William James, however factual or fictitious their interactions reported later by Stein may
have been.
Though the veracity of her account in Alice B. Toklas of receiving a postcard from
William James after walking out of an exam she did “not feel a bit like” taking (79) has
been questioned by scholars, it is not an understatement to suggest that even from the
beginning of her academic experience, Stein adored William James. In what are now
referred to as “the Radcliffe themes,” the essays written during her required English
composition course (1894-95), and first reprinted as part of Rosalind Miller’s Gertrude
Stein: Form and Intelligibility, Stein’s high esteem of James shines through:
Is life worth living? Yes, a thousand times yes when the world still holds
such spirits as Prof. James. He is truly a man among men; a scientist of
force and originality embodying all that is strongest and worthiest in the
scientific spirit…. He stands firmly, nobly for the dignity of man. His faith
is not that of a cringing coward before an all-powerful master, but of a
strong man willing to fight, to suffer and endure…. What can one say
more? He is a strong sane noble personality reacting truly on all
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experience that life has given him. He is a man take him for all in all.
(Stein, in Miller 146)
(As for the overly dramatic opening question, it should be noted that “Is Life Worth
Living?” was the title of a lecture first offered by William James at Harvard in 1985 and
printed in various forms and publications, including Talks to Teachers on Psychology
[1899].) Stein would understatedly write later, in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas,
that “the really lasting impression of her Radcliffe life came through William James”
(78). Also, “William James delighted her. His personality and his teaching and his way of
amusing himself and his students all pleased her” (Toklas 78). It is no wonder that
scholars have thus far focused on her psychological experiments in William James’s
laboratory as a key—if not to deciphering her text, at least to expanding our
understanding of her project.
It is worth pausing for a moment to note the complex moment in which Stein
found herself studying philosophy at Harvard and how it relates to Foucault’s first of the
three potential solutions he offers to respond to the cultural fear of discourse: the
questioning of the will to truth (229). When Foucault describes the will to truth or the
will to knowledge, he offers the academic world and classroom as partly responsible for
perpetuating the culture of codification that keeps discourse in check. Foucault
“believe[s] that this will to knowledge, thus reliant upon institutional support and
distribution, tends to exercise a sort of pressure, a power of constraint upon other forms
of discourse…[and] daily grows in strength, in depth and implacability” (219). Consider
the role of William James at the turn of the twentieth century in the academy. James,
often called the father of American psychology, made a career at the intersection of
philosophy, psychology, and physiology. The newness of psychology as its own
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discipline and the growing interest in the psychology laboratory to study the inner
workings of the human mind and even religious and spiritual experience stands in stark
contrast to an older, classical understanding of pedagogy, not to mention the study of
classical virtue and human nature. James was writing a new discourse of sorts—as the
author of perhaps the first psychology textbooks—and also reframing the discourse
passed down from ancient Greece. How could this shaping, constraining, and scientizing
of discourse not influence the likes of an impressionable literary-minded philosopher
such as Gertrude Stein?
In addition to the influence of James in the academy at the time, both George
Santayana and Josiah Royce were significant philosophy voices at Harvard, and both had
connections to Gertrude Stein, who in addition to her coursework and majoring in
philosophy, served as the secretary of the Philosophy Club during her undergraduate
years. Santayana, a poet and aesthetician, published his monograph The Sense of Beauty
(1896) during Stein’s undergraduate years, and Royce, a professor of the history of
philosophy, served as the chair of the philosophy department from 1894 until 1898.
We know that Gertrude Stein took other philosophy courses in addition to those
taught by Professor James, though certainly she did end up in seven of his classes,
including time spent in his psychology laboratory. Even Stein’s Philosophy I course is
often described by biographers as being taught “by” James—psychology was a new field
and did not yet exist as a separate department—but his contribution was alongside
lectures by Santayana and George Herbert Palmer, who was a professor of natural
religion, moral philosophy, and civil polity. Additionally, Stein’s other philosophy
courses included Royce’s metaphysics, comparative religion, and German philosophy.
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(Stein’s coursework has been detailed by many biographers. Linda Wagner-Martin
waded through all of Stein’s letters and academic paraphernalia housed at Yale and
Harvard, and chronicled both the academic and personal family life of Gertrude Stein in
Favored Strangers. Richard Bridgeman’s Gertrude Stein in Pieces includes an appendix
of all Stein’s coursework while she was at Radcliffe and Miller’s Form and Intelligibility
reprints the full text of her freshmen English composition themes; nearly all biographies
summarize her coursework.)
With Stein absorbing the history of knowledge in the classroom—a prime
location, for Foucault, of discourse constraint and interpretation—majoring in
philosophy, and studying under William James, it comes as no surprise that her later
thinking and work reflect a question of what discourse is and how it controls what is true
when it comes to human nature, specifically what it means for human beings to be
virtuous or act virtuously. When Stein mentions her observation of a “bottom nature” of
the volunteers during the experiments in the psychology laboratory of William James,
these are the concerns she demonstrably works through. Her first publication, in fact, was
a co-written piece with Leon Solomons on Normal Motor Automatism, which appeared
in the Psychological Review in 1896, based on her search for truth within the laboratory
system. Solomons and Stein explored whether writing, reading, and understanding can
happen unconsciously or automatically. (Perhaps because of her scientific interests and
certainly because of her difficult and unwieldy writing style, Stein would later be accused
of automatism in her own writing, which she roundly denied [Mellow 33].)
During these automatism experiments in the laboratory, Stein, in Hoffman’s view,
became “mainly interested in the people involved in her experiments and not the data
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they provided; not their reactions to what they were doing but how they seemed to her to
manifest themselves as prototypes” (130). Certainly Stein’s claims about character types
and the tendencies of the laboratory volunteers to say the same sorts of things could be
narrowly interpreted as “prototypes,” especially due to Stein’s experimental writing style
and the ways she portrays her characters with shades of character in the moral sense. But
this interpretation of her comments about what she learned during her time in the
laboratory strikes me as a little unfair and only begets a narrow reading of works like
Three Lives and The Making of Americans, both in which, says Hoffman, “the characters
function almost solely as demonstrations of a proposition made by the author about a
personality type” (132). What Stein says about those experiments is more complex:
[I] began to get enormously interested in hearing how everybody said the
same thing over and over again with infinite variations but over and over
again until finally if you listened with great intensity you could hear it rise
and fall and tell all that that there was inside them, not so much by the
actual words they said or the thoughts they had but the movement of their
thoughts and words endlessly the same and endlessly different. (Lectures
138)
Though Stein calls this endless similarity and endless difference the “bottom nature” of
people she describes later as she recollects her time in the laboratory, this “nature” need
not be understood as prototypes of human nature to be used for the purposes of an
author’s exploration of personality types. Such an understanding of the project she
undertakes in portraying her characters specifically and human beings more generally
limits Stein’s author role to that of prescriptive describer, rather than nuanced observer of
humanity attempting to articulate the difficult contradictions of human action and human
conviction, as we will see as we discuss the role of virtue and virtuous behavior. A
reading of Stein that focuses in on Stein’s intentional dismantling of the discourse often
underlying discussions of virtuous behavior versus virtuous individuals offers a more
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complex view of “bottom nature.” We will find this to be the case upon closer inspection
of Stein’s characters in “Melanctha” and Stein’s broader project to capture the “the thing
about men and women that is interesting.”
But the question remains: when Stein tells us that her conclusion about the
“bottom nature” of people is that “habits of attention are reflexes of the complete
character of the individual” (Lectures 138), what sort of “character” does she mean?
What is “complete character”? Does she mean a moral compass that guides the individual
toward right (or “good,” as Melanctha strives to be)? Or does she mean the way
individuals act out a narrative like roles within a play, bestowed with certain
predetermined or established characteristics by their nature as human beings in the
world? The word “character” in modern English is not simply defined and has added so
many layers of meaning since its initial use as a tool or implement for imprinting or
embossing. According to Jennifer Ashton, “for both James and Stein, character comes
down to habit” (305). And, as Stein tells us in Everybody’s Autobiography, “everything is
a habit” (54, my emphasis). The first sentence of James’s chapter on habit in his 1890
Principles of Psychology—published prior to Stein’s enrollment at Harvard—strikes the
same chord: “When we look at living creatures from an outward point of view, one of the
first things that strike us is that they are bundles of habits.” Animals and human beings
alike, according to James, consist of habitual behavior on some level, some innate or
instinctive and others learned through education and, in the case of human beings, reason.
What James goes on to say about habit, however, is not able to capture Stein’s
broad use of the term, especially the way she connects habit to character—and,
tangentially, to other things in the world, like the “habit” of national revolution occurring
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within countries like France (Everybody’s Autobiography 54). James makes habit a
physical, scientific principle, rather than a philosophical, aesthetic, or moral concern:
“[T]he philosophy of habit is… a chapter in physics rather than in physiology or
psychology. That it is at bottom a physical principle is admitted by all good recent writers
on the subject” (105). Stein’s initial work on habit may have begun in the scientific
laboratory, but her conclusions did not remain there and instead incorporate a continual
questioning of just what it means to be a human being—what similarities and differences
were being repeated by the fellow students studied through the experiments? What was
the “bottom nature” of humanity being revealed? And how did Stein’s observations in the
laboratory fit in with the classical philosophical discourse being filtered through her other
coursework?
Overviews of classical philosophy at Harvard at the turn of the century would
certainly have included at least a wave of the hand toward Aristotelian and Platonic
thought, if not explicit and extended study. The role of virtue in Aristotelian ethics could
reasonably have infiltrated Stein’s understanding of the bottom nature of human beings.
To read her early work in terms of the question “What does it mean to live a virtuous
life?” might trigger new understandings of her early work’s significance. As outlined
above, we know that Stein’s Philosophy I course was an overview of religious
philosophy, so why need we assume it was only under the tutelage of Professor James in
the psychology laboratory and her work on automation with Leon Solomons that Stein’s
understanding of character would have been shaped? Surely it is unfair to her learning
capacity, her education, and her creative genius to assume her time studying automatism
and unconscious habit in the lab was the sole influence on her later career’s ongoing
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work developing character and characters, cultivating an aesthetic, and engaging in
cultural critique. Involved in all of this work, at some level, is an ongoing interest in
human nature generally and the role of virtue and vice more particularly.
It is important to remember that the initial drafting of Stein’s early works, three of
which transform Stein’s personal romantic and platonic experiences into the recycled and
linked plots of Fernhurst, Q.E.D., and “Melanctha,” were likely composed soon after her
formal education came to an end. And in each of them, virtue and vice broadly as well as
specific virtues and virtuous behavior are poked and prodded by characters and by the
narrative voice. Though our later conversation will explore this potential virtue-loaded
reading of “Melanctha” in particular, Stein’s most explicit virtue project, we should keep
in mind that each of these early versions of the same narrative are nudging at the same
thing.
In “Adele,” for example, the first part of Q.E.D., Adele tells Helen and Sophie,
You don’t realise the important fact that virtue and vice have it in common
that they are vulgar when not passionately given. You think that they carry
within them a different power. Yes they do because they have different
world-values, but as for their relation to vulgarity, it is as true of vice as of
virtue that you can’t sell what should be passionately given without
forcing yourself into many acts of vulgarity and the chances are that in
endeavoring to escape the vulgarity of virtue, you will find yourselves
engulfed in the vulgarity of vice. (207-208)
The connections of “Melanctha” and Q.E.D. and the real-life love affairs of Stein during
graduate school have been detailed elsewhere. Adele is Stein, we are told; Jeff Campbell
is Stein. But, while interesting and helpful for some readings of the text, these
connections can be limiting rather than helpful when offered as the go-to interpretation of
Stein’s project, especially when, as a result, autobiographical exploration displaces
thematic interpretation.
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Even though the three texts “Melanctha,” Q.E.D., and Fernhurst, I suggest, help
illustrate Stein’s initial prodding of virtue, vice, and human nature, it is only fair to
acknowledge that such themes of virtue that appear in at least Q.E.D. and “Melanctha”
sound more like echoes than coincidences, more like a repeated exploration on the part of
Stein into the ways the discourse of virtue plays out among interpersonal relationships,
rather than a deliberate articulation of what virtue is or the struggle to live it out. In the
earlier Q.E.D., however, Stein arguably explores the potential for disrupting and
subverting what it means to have virtue, to act virtuously, and to be virtuous.
Q.E.D. introduces “courage” in a similar manner to “Melanctha,” as we will see
in concrete ways throughout chapters two and three. Stein’s narrator describes Helen’s
“courage and daring”: “Her courage never fails and that is what makes her father so
bitter,” Sophie tells Adele, who replies, “Helen has courage I don’t doubt that” (220).
Stein, here as in “Melanctha,” makes courage and other virtue-words more complex than
readers might first realize. To be virtuous is to exhibit the virtues, so to be courageous is
to display courage consistently; more classical understandings of virtue could not
acknowledge a courageous person behaving any way other than courageous. Stein has
already begun to disrupt these understandings in her earliest drafts of fiction, separating
definitions of virtue from lived out virtuous experience.
I’ll explore the ambiguity of Stein’s language later, but for now consider one
more example from Q.E.D. which muddies the waters of virtue ethics even more.
Adele—the character most identified with Stein herself—replies to Helen’s praising of
Adele’s honesty, “‘Oh honest,’ returned Adele lightly. ‘Honesty is a selfish virtue. Yes I
am honest enough’” (213-14, my emphasis). What are readers to make of a “selfish
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virtue”? Isn’t a “virtue” by definition something that is not selfish? In “Melanctha,” Rose,
too, was described as having paradoxical “selfish wisdom.” At the very least, Stein is
learning here in her early career—or, rather, before Stein could even be said to have had a
career—to try to broaden the definitions established by the discourse of classical virtue.
Stein distinguishes between innate character types and the actions of lived experience—
and these are, unparadoxically, two sides of the same coin, as the cliché goes. That “coin”
is virtue.
If virtue-laden readings of Stein’s written work seem far-fetched, consider Stein’s
personal correspondence cited, among other places, in Mellow’s biography. Indeed
morality was, at the very least, a topic of discussion among Stein’s group of educated
women friends in Baltimore. In a letter to Stein from Emma Lootz, for instance, Lootz
writes, “I did look disapproving when you said you had been marauding with your
friends, but I may as well believe you when you say you were good tho [sic] I’m afraid
our conceptions of virtue differ” (Mellow 60). Perhaps what we need to explore are these
questions: what was Stein’s “conception” of virtue? Could a closer look at her early
works, especially “Melanctha,” in terms of her exploration of virtue open up her later
works for readers and critics alike? What could it mean to our appreciation of Stein’s
project to define “character” with all of its shades of meaning: from an imprinting tool, to
the imprint itself, to an identifying characteristic, to moral qualities, to the created
persons within a text? What if we keep Foucault close at hand as we describe Stein’s
separation of traditional discourse about virtue and character and habit from the academy
in which she was taught to converse in those terms?

19

These questions, I will show, are more related than they may at first appear, and
help to reveal new understandings of Stein’s complicated and ongoing project to capture
and critique human nature and, also, to locate herself as genius-writer within it.
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Chapter 3
Running Clear: Word Choice, Character, and the Complexity of Stein’s Project
So it was with Gertrude’s repetitive sentences, each one building up,
phrase by phrase, the substance of her characters.
James Mellow, Charmed Circle 71
Jane Palatini Bowers suggests that Stein, while writing Three Lives,
discovered that language could do other things besides name, describe,
and report. It could, for instance, embody rhythms…. If freed from
intention and expectation…language could also play…. In Stein’s work,
then, the objective world becomes less and less important and the object
that is the work of art and the process by which it is created become
paramount. (35)
Three Lives, in fact, was “acknowledged later as the earliest modernist, experimental
fiction” (Bowers 6), though Stein wouldn’t necessarily have agreed. In Toklas, we find
that Stein considered The Making of Americans to be “the beginning, really the beginning
of modern writing” (215). Regardless, Stein’s words were doing something new,
changing the narrative landscape and carving out what it meant to be a twentieth-century
modernist. Whether it was Stein’s purpose to make language “play” is up for discussion
as is the “object that is the work of art” becoming “paramount,” but Bowers is correct to
note Stein’s ability to “free” language “from intention and expectation”—and not just the
intention and expectation of her contemporary readers or reviewers or fellow artists and
friends, but past generations of readers and writers and artists and philosophers, those
who have controlled what is said about knowledge and human nature, and those who will
continue to control it. Here again Foucault’s articulation about the way discourse has
been controlled at a widespread cultural level helps us understand how Stein begins to
“free” her language from this control.
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In her lecture “What Is English Literature?” Stein traces the decisions modernist
writers need to make back to the Elizabethan period: “There was a choice between
serving god and mammon. This choice has nothing to do with religion, it has nothing to
do with success. It has to do with something different than that, it has to do with
completion…. And words had everything to do with it” (Lectures 22, 23). It is the
deliberate act of choosing words—acknowledging the power that words have within a
writer’s milieu and then crafting art intentionally in ways that shape this power and,
potentially, subvert it through the written work—that marks the work as complete. And
the evolution of words is ongoing. In classic Stein obscurity combined with chattiness,
she says,
This makes literature words whether you choose them whether you use
them, whether they are there whether or not you use them and whether
they are no longer there even when you are still going on using them. And
in this way a century is a century. One century has words, another century
chooses words, another century uses words and then another century using
the words no longer has them.
All this as you have it inside you settles something it settles what
you complete if you complete anything, it settles whether you address
something as you express anything. In short it settles what you do as you
proceed to write which you certainly do, that is which I certainly do.
(Lectures 27)
Stein’s confession “that is which I certainly do” reminds us that she, too, is a product of
the generations that have gone before; former centuries’ choice of words, use of words,
has settled inside her in such a way as to enable her to complete “anything.”
In the way previous centuries’ words shape the work of modern writers—if those
writers “address something,” that is—the influence acts as a subconscious shaping and
framing of the writers’ works, partly because of subconscious associations of particular
words. This is not to say that Stein’s writing or word choice is subconscious. On the
contrary, Stein was constantly aware, perhaps too aware, of her project of redefining and
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subverting discourse to convey new meaning: “I have been the creative literary mind of
the century,” she announces matter-of-factly in Everybody’s Autobiography (22). “I am
the most important writer writing today” (29). The “genius” of her work is in her ability
to take the subconscious word-association cloud floating around the modern world and
intentionally poking and prodding those word associations to subvert the status quo, at
least in regard to human nature, habit, and character.
Word choice is at the heart of Gertrude Stein’s writing, and central to her
meaning-making-and-remaking project. Jonathan Levin connects the linguistic
experiments of William James, rather than his work on the unconscious or habits of
attention as so many other Stein scholars do, to Stein’s understanding of the role of
words. James’s word exercises sought to empty words of meaning by “reduc[ing them] to
a bare sensation” (Levin 151). Levin links this meaning-emptying of words to Stein’s
writing, but notes a slight difference:
She follows William James in recognizing that words acquire meaning
from the mind’s stock of associations, but she refuses to allow habitual
patterns of association to obscure the multiple associative contexts of
words.
Stein’s writing, especially those aspects of it which have seemed
so enigmatic, is designed to resist the repose that would put an end to the
continuous movement of perception and understanding. Her style
develops, and endlessly changes over time, from the conviction that
perception and conception are essentially dynamic processes that we
renew and transform in every new moment of language use. The
continuous present which she seeks to represent is the dynamic moment of
this renewal and transformation. Stein’s words are always in transition,
foregrounding the processes that make and remake meanings. (154)
Whereas James focused in on the stagnation of word association, a frozen or closed
system, Stein allowed for myriad and dynamic interpretations and reinterpretations of
words. With her repeated use of virtue words, like “wisdom” and “courage” in
“Melanctha” or the more benign “good” throughout Three Lives, Stein offers shades of
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these words to her readers and to the characters themselves being described. Indeed, part
of “meaning” being remade over and over in the text is the respect offered to Stein’s
characters on the page that is offered to human characters in real life: the freedom to shift
and change and not be trapped by the propensity to behave or misbehave in acceptable
and unacceptable ways. Stein’s words that “seem so enigmatic” are what make her so
confident—perhaps rightly—in her own creative genius, subverting the acceptable
discourse of literature and of classical philosophy by muddying the waters.
Because Stein’s word choice is arguably particular, it is hard to synthesize her
strong sense of purpose and specificity of language I’m arguing for here with her writing
technique, at least as articulated by her friend Carl Van Vechten. Praising her “unique”
method, Van Vechten describes it thus: “She usually writes in the morning, and she sets
down the words as they come from her pen; they bubble, they flow; they surge through
her brain and she sets them down. You may regard them as nonsense, but the fact remains
that effective imitations of her style do not exist” (in Curnutt 155). Is it reasonable to
believe that her words do just “bubble” and “flow” from her pen as she sits meditatively
each morning? Perhaps. Or perhaps the image of the flowing pen is one Stein
promulgated to emphasize the role of the genius writer she was reputed to be, or at least
the image she reported to have. Her notebooks, which were transcribed by Toklas and
eventually preserved in the Yale Libraries, illustrate a complex drafting process that
includes, at the very least, crossed out words, playful experimentation, and notes to
Toklas throughout (see Dydo). Regardless of whether Stein wrote as the inspired genius
she claimed to be or not, the way that the mechanics of words, grammatical conventions,
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sounds, and her historical milieu work together to create meaning fascinated Stein
throughout her career.
In fact, Stein used the mechanics of writing as a means of explaining in her
lectures what she saw as a shift in writing emphasis through the centuries: from the words
of the seventeenth century, to phrases of the eighteenth century, to sentences of the
nineteenth century, to paragraphs of the twentieth (see Lectures 42-49). She places
herself in the twentieth century, with her powerful use of paragraphs. And yet, not
surprisingly to her readers, it is not Stein’s paragraphs that literary critics spend their own
paragraphs and pages upon pages explaining, defining, poking, and prodding. It is her
words within those paragraphs. The image of muddied streams running clear as they flow
around the globe is a helpful metaphor here, too—from words to phrases to sentences to
paragraphs to the words that make up those paragraphs: it is all genius flowing from the
pencil of Gertrude Stein.
Stein’s words—their precision as well as lack thereof—have been a stumbling
block to readers and educated critics alike since her earliest publications. Compared to
James Joyce, for example, another modernist, “Stein did not seem learned. Her primitive
and childlike vocabulary provoked condescending smiles” (Dydo 13). In her pursuit of
publication for Three Lives, Stein was treated as if she were not a native English speaker,
despite her own conviction that her writing was indeed straightforward and precise.
Writing of herself in the third person, Stein reports, “Later she did not understand why
since the writing [in Three Lives] was all so clear and natural they mocked at and were
enraged by her work” (Toklas 35).
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When Three Lives, “the book that ushered in the modern period in American
fiction” (Charters vii), was published in 1909, the reviews were somewhat diverse,
ranging from the accusation that the “stories utterly lack construction and focus” (Curnutt
11) to the more nuanced claim that “the slow, broken rhythm of the prose corresponds to
the rhythm of the ‘lives’ and to the reader’s rhythmic comprehension” (12). One
anonymous reviewer suggested that if Stein “should attempt the same things with minds
of a higher caliber, the result might be more entertaining” (9). It’s not a bad suggestion,
really, if “entertainment” were high on Stein’s list of motivations to write at the turn of
the century. But such was not the case. One reviewer, in particular, begins to capture the
essence of Stein’s narrative project and is worth noting for its being the exception in the
ocean of negativity: “Not written in the vernacular, it yet gives that impression. At first
one fancies the author using repetition as a refrain is used in poetry. But it is something
more subtle still; something involved, something turning back, for a new beginning, for a
lost strand in the spinning” (10). Indeed, Stein’s project is one of subtlety, a subtle
subversion of the very words that seem elementary, childlike, repetitive. Stein’s writing
and her characters turn and return to the basics of behavior and human nature,
discovering and rediscovering and questioning what it can possibly mean to be virtuous,
to act virtuously, to live in the complex world of “good” and “nice,” a world of “wisdom”
and “courage” and, yet, “wandering.” Stein herself wanders back to the words as she
searches for “a lost strand in the spinning.”
Stein describes her writing of “Melanctha” in the often cited 1926 lecture,
“Composition as Explanation”:
I wrote a negro story called Melanctha. In that there was a constant
recurring and beginning there was a marked direction in the direction of
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being in the present although naturally I had been accustomed to past
present and future, and why, because the composition forming around me
was a prolonged present. . . . I knew nothing of a continuous present but it
came naturally to me to make one, it was simple it was clear to me and
nobody knew why it was done like that, I did not myself although
naturally to me it was natural. (220)
Stein once again falls back on her role as the genius writer in claiming that she herself did
not even know why the story unfolded as it did in the “prolonged present” though to her
“it was natural.” The oft-discussed “continuous present” in Stein’s collection, I want to
suggest, supports Stein’s project as I describe it: a complex subversion of the way human
nature and experience are captured on the page. Virtue and vice and decisions and
immobility and contradiction in lived experience are worth exploring and it takes a
Gertrude Stein figure—confident, even arrogant, with both literary and laboratory and
philosophical training—to capture that complexity in every moment of a story as it
unfolds and refolds back on itself. Perhaps this echoes the anonymous reviewer’s
perception of “something turning back, for a new beginning.”
The jarring difference of Stein’s writing from that of her contemporaries might
disguise some of the subtlety of Stein’s project, though Three Lives, in general, is one of
the most narrative and straightforward of the texts in her oeuvre. Something subtle,
something readers can lose in the repetition, has been established here and in the seeming
hundreds of books published about Stein’s work over the last half century. Most
important to Stein’s project as I hope to present it is the precision and rhythm of the
language that turns words and phrases back on themselves to add meaning, “for a new
beginning,” as the reviewer wrote, rather than merely point to the stark inability of the
English language to capture the essence of human nature—though it may be arguable
Stein attempts to do both.
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What is most pertinent about Stein’s use of language, her use of precise words in
a seemingly repetitive way, is her commitment to writing “directly.” “Any one can use
words to say something,” Stein writes.
And in using these words to say what he has to say he may use those
words directly or indirectly. If he uses these words indirectly he says what
he intends to have heard by somebody who is to hear and in so doing
inevitably he has to serve mammon. […] Now serving god for a writer
who is writing is writing anything directly, it makes no difference what it
is but it must be direct, the relation between the thing done and the doer
must be direct. In this way there is completion and the essence of the
completed thing is completion. (Lectures 23-24)
For Stein, “the relationship between the thing done and the doer must be direct” in order
for writing to be complete. By “complete,” Stein suggests that the written work stems
directly from the writer’s being authentic, rather than for the reader’s reception of the
word.
Bowers argues, however, that Stein’s goal in her repetition of words is the
opposite of precision of language, that it is rather the unreliability of it: “Stein
demonstrates this chameleon-like quality of language through the use of repetition. The
more she repeats a word or a phrase, the more she reveals its unreliability” (50). But if
Stein’s goal is completeness and writing directly—that is, serving god rather than
mammon, as Stein herself says—perhaps language isn’t unreliable but especially reliable;
what if it is the readers and the cultural milieu that are unreliable in their reception of the
work? The writer’s goal is not reception but precision and clarity in conveying the human
experience, in conveying character, in conveying the difficulty of expectations and life
and the words that convey our core experiences being handed down through generations
in a way that is unlivable and unreliable.
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When the writer succeeds in writing directly, however, it could be argued from
Stein’s lecture that the reader can sense the completeness of the work through the words.
Consider how Mariann DeKoven describes the complexity communicated by Stein in
“Melanctha” through her repetition and particularity of language as “the beginning of
Stein’s journey into experimental writing”:
the ordinary, simple vocabulary, even more reduced than in the earlier
novellas, is often used so elastically, to cover so many meanings, and at
the same time so indeterminately, that certain words become emblematic,
invoking large, open-ended complexes of feeling and association, as well
as meaning, each time they appear. These complexes of feeling,
association, and meaning remain vague, inchoate; strongly felt by the
reader but never clearly articulated by the narrator. (44)
Pointing to Stein’s “complexes of feeling” conveyed by her narrator’s repetitive word
choice accurately captures Stein’s project of writing directly, but to call these complexes
of feeling “open-ended,” and to suggest her “ordinary, simple vocabulary” is used “so
indeterminately,” unfairly characterizes the power of Stein’s language as somehow vague
and meandering, when in fact, I want to argue, Stein’s simple vocabulary succeeds
because of its precision.
Stein’s narrators in Three Lives, and especially her narrator in “Melanctha,” are
far from simple-minded or barely illiterate. Rather, Stein uses their particularity of
vocabulary, as simple as it is, to point to the way the human condition is often
inexpressible by the limited vocabulary—or perhaps historical understanding of
particular words—that are ascribed by the current milieu. As David Buckham
understands it, Stein’s narrative project fits on the modernist spectrum because she “is
questioning the value of an omniscient, autotelic narrator who tells what is going on and
who relates the meaning of what is going on”; but
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Stein’s particular innovation, perhaps, was to have a narrator who seems
to be omniscient, who seems to be conventional, employing verbal
structures that would be common to a mimetic emulation of a particular
colloquial ‘voice’, but whose language works, through overemphasis of
these structures, through the use of repetitive structures both at the level of
diction and syntax, to undermine any sense of thematic synthesis or clear
referential meaning. (Buckham 68)
Perhaps this is why some contemporary reviewers commented on Stein’s use of dialect in
“Melanctha” and a prospective publishing house thought Stein was not a native English
speaker. Stein’s narrator “seems” to be a lot of things on the surface—conventional,
colloquial, and, as DeKoven claimed, open-ended and indeterminate. But these
interpretations of the narrative voice are undermined by the word choice itself, by the
intentional repetition that opens up the text.
It is not, as Buckham suggests, thematic interpretation or meaning that are at
stake, however; it is more than that. It is Stein’s project as a whole to convey character by
breaking apart classical understandings of human nature and habit and by resisting the
rise of scientific discourse that began to replace those classical understandings. And that
project, I want to argue, is certainly not undermined by her simple-vocabularied,
straightforward-yet-repetitive narrator precisely because of the specific words Stein puts
in that narrative voice. Repetition and word choice become central to this project and its
successful conveyance.
Within Stein’s narrative repetition of broad ideologically charged words—like
“good” and “bad”—is also a focus on details, which enables Stein to tweak her emphases,
move the story forward rather than become stagnant and muddied, and, what is most
important, bring out the developing character of her central players of Three Lives more
generally, and the “Melanctha” story in particular. Stein maintains that she “has always
been possessed by the intellectual passion for exactitude in the description of inner and
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outer reality” (Toklas 211). On the opening page of “The Good Anna,” for example, after
announcing simply that “Anna led an arduous and troubled life” (3), the narrator
describes the physical space of that troubled life:
Anna managed the whole little house for Miss Mathilda. It was a funny
little house, one of a whole row of all the same kind that made a close pile
like a row of dominoes that a child knocks over, for they were built along
a street which at this point came down a steep hill. They were funny little
houses, two stories high, with red brick fronts and long white steps.
An entire paragraph of detailed description such as this one stands out in Three Lives
because it does rarely occur, and is perhaps the reason critics often overlook the power of
these rare descriptions and the ways they alter our readings of Stein’s more simple and
repetitive statements—in this case, the lead-in about Anna’s “arduous and troubled life.”
Managing a house as precariously placed as “dominoes that a child knocks over” conveys
a particular type of meaning, a tentative and anxious and unsecure meaning.
As the story continues, we are encouraged to agree twice more that Anna’s life is
indeed arduous and troubled (5, 10)—a straight repetition without altering the order of
the words. These repetitions, I am arguing, are not to be mathematically filed away into
categories or unpacked and repacked with the precision of science, as some more
logically minded explainers of the text tend to do; repetition is part of Stein’s careful
project to subvert normal, recognizable language used to characterize and pull a story
along.
In “Melanctha,” which is by far the most complex in terms of Stein’s repetitive
project to emphasize the struggle of discourse to convey lived experience, Stein’s
narrator still pauses to describe detailed moments of characterization, especially in using
physical characteristics to convey inner traits and turmoil. Consider this early description
in the story to set up the contrast between Melanctha and Rose:
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Why did the subtle, intelligent, attractive, half white girl Melanctha
Herbert love and do for and demean herself in service to this coarse,
decent, sullen, ordinary, black childish Rose, and why was this unmoral,
promiscuous, shiftless Rose married, and that’s not so common either, to a
good man of the negroes, while Melanctha with her white blood and
attraction and her desire for a right position had not yet been really
married? (60)
It is unlike Stein to pack adjectives together into a list as she does here, three times in a
single sentence, but that compounding of details complicates the characterization of both
women. Ulla Dydo comments on Stein’s “reliance on minute details, including tiny
inflections of language, to develop the evolving continuity of the present. Stein always
insists on the importance of small things—an infinitude of tiny details rather than a
collective totality” (95). The importance of these details to Stein’s narrative project
affirms the role particular words play in Stein’s early fiction.
It would be unfair to leave out Stein’s comments about the role of description in
writing, especially if it seems to skew away from her background in science toward
literature and other aesthetic pursuits. In fact, Stein attributes her process of learning
about the importance of detailed description—“the complete description of everything”—
to her work in the scientific laboratory of William James:
When I was working with William James I completely learned one thing,
that science is continuously busy with the complete description of
something, and ultimately the complete description of anything with
ultimately the complete description of everything. If this can really be
done the complete description of everything then what else is there to do.
We may well say nothing, but and this is the thing that makes everything
continue to be anything, that after all what does happen is that as relatively
few people spend all their time describing anything and they stop and so in
the meantime as everything goes on somebody else can always commence
and go on. And so description is really unending. (Lectures 156)
What Stein does with description in her work—pairing detailed description with
repetitive word plays and the subversion of traditional word and narrative choices—
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might rightly be called “the thing that makes everything continue to be anything.” And
that thing, for Stein, began in the laboratory, though she did not leave it there.
As the building blocks of bigger narrative pieces to the seemingly repetitive
puzzle that fits together into Stein’s stories, words become even more important. Even as
early as 1951, in one of the first biographies of Gertrude Stein, Donald Sutherland notes
the power of Stein’s narrative choice, suggesting that “Stein uses repetition and
dislocation to make the word bear all the meaning it has” (48). Or, we might say, Stein
enables words to bear all the meaning they don’t normally have at all: Stein loads more
meaning into her words, sentences, and paragraphs by subverting conventional
understandings of simple and common (and, often, value-laden) words.
Stein, ever the explainer, describes her project as one of insistence, not repetition,
which are not the same thing:
And so let us think seriously of the difference between repetition and
insistence…. [N]o matter how often you tell the same story if there is
anything alive in the telling the emphasis is different. It has to be, anybody
can know that. It is very like a frog hopping he cannot ever hop exactly the
same distance or the same way of hopping at every hop. A bird’s singing
is perhaps the nearest thing to repetition but if you listen they too vary
their insistence. That is the human expression saying the same thing and in
insisting and we all insist varying the emphasising. (Lectures, 168)
Insistence suggests a variation of emphases; repetition is more of the same, an ad
nauseum quality Stein’s stories never approach. Indeed, Stein is not just telling and
retelling a story as she repeats particular words, or phrases, or even episodes within the
narrative. Within one single story, like “Melanctha,” she uses repetition of words,
phrases, and fragments of conversation combined with precise descriptions to do
something more than just succeed in keeping something “alive in the telling.” In the
introduction to Stein’s Lectures in America, Wendy Steiner describes Stein’s “insistence”
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as “a sameness in difference” and “the inevitable mode of experience, the way essence
manifests itself in time” (xx). Let’s connect this to Stein’s example of a hopping frog.
A frog “cannot ever hop exactly the same distance or the same way of hopping at
every hop,” Stein tells us. A common enough image, Stein need not quote a scientific
study about amphibious behavior. When Stein repeats words with varying emphasis,
varying insistence, she draws out the experience of the frog moving from stone to lily
pad. Even if the frog leaps back to the stone, his wet footprints will land in a different
place—both literally, on the stone itself, and metaphorically, in time, as his experience at
one moment necessarily differs from the seemingly same experience at a different
moment. Even in a nonrational creature like a frog, each experience as similar as it may
seem necessarily differs in time: perhaps he is more or less hungry than the last time his
webbed feet left their print here, perhaps the weather has changed, a predator came out of
hiding, an insect appeared. It is not a stretch to see how more complex changes within a
text’s narrative or a character’s experience within a story change the meaning of that
moment of the story for the character as she experiences it in that moment. Or the way a
reader recognizes the character’s experience in that moment.
Let’s take this one step further. The success of Steinian repetition, though, points
less to the the motion of the frog, never landing in the same place twice, and more to the
frog itself. Rather than the essence of a character’s experience, rather than the frog’s
progress around the pond, Mellow suggests that Stein’s insistence might be offering
readers more than just the characters’ experience but rather offering the actual characters:
“So it was with Gertrude repetitive sentences, each one building up, phrase by phrase, the
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substance of her characters” (Mellow 71). What could the “substance” of her characters
be?
At the heart of Stein’s repetitive project, I want to claim, are her characters—not
just their role as individuals within a larger story but the development of their character,
their virtues and vices, the way they live and love in the world, and what it means to be a
human being. These are the shades of meaning overlapping and overwhelming the
English word “character” by the turn of the twentieth century. And character, as I’ve been
establishing, is “the thing about men and women that is interesting.”
Though Three Lives, as Stein’s earliest published literary manuscript, remains one
of the most linear and straightforward of her works of fiction, Stein’s use of repetition
early in her career set it apart from her contemporaries at its publication in 1909.
“Melanctha: Each One as She May,” the longest of the three vignettes and the only one
with a subtitle, was intended by Stein to be last in the manuscript. Set in an African
American neighborhood in Baltimore, Stein uses repetition of words, sentences, ideas,
and even key story events as a way to do something narratively.
But what is she doing? Clearly it is complicated, and unsurprisingly, the critics
don’t agree. Is Stein using language, especially an intentional repetition-with-difference,
to convey a complexity of experience, similar to but more highly refined than stream-ofconsciousness? Or is Stein using language to point out the very failure of language to be
able to convey the complexity of lived or subconscious experience? Yes and yes,
depending on who is doing the reading. DeKoven calls Stein’s use of repetition “a
complex, overdetermined phenomenon” in the text with the goal of mimesis: “it gives
truer representation than standard writing of the raw process of consciousness” (41).
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Perhaps Stein is trying to capture the constantly changing, contradictory chaos that is the
interior mind of her nontraditional characters living in the world. Walker agrees that the
repetitive words’ “patterning forcefully enacts the play of passions, the frustrating
processes of thought and communication” even if “the simple words the characters use
are shown to be slippery, unstable instruments” (38-39). David Buckham, however,
considers Stein’s repetition to render her language and hence the narrative itself
ambiguous (56), rather than a reflection of complicated lived experience or interior
consciousness; and Janice Doane maintains similarly that the story of Melanctha “is
Stein’s strongest indication of dissatisfaction with the inability of repetitive retelling to
generate new knowledge” (77). But what if Stein is generating new knowledge, because
in the telling of the story with insistence, it is “alive”? In the telling of the story, the frog
doesn’t leap to the same lilypad twice, even if it is the same physical lilypad.
Perhaps Dydo’s explanation of Stein’s insistent words offers the best explanation
for these varying and even divergent understandings: “precisely because [Stein’s] words
are centripetal, pointing inward, to the piece, rather than centrifugal, pointing outward, to
the world, readers find entry into her work difficult and look for help in a world that
offers none” (23). Within the world of Three Lives, we know from Stein’s insistence and
characterization that emotions are messy, that people are complex, and that lived
experience is not always—and perhaps never—fair. Characters are developing character
through inner and outer experiences as Stein insistently transforms conventional language
into a subversion of discourse that defines “character” and maybe even human nature
itself in new, radical ways. Stein is sifting the dirt out of muddy streams.
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This radical use of language and its potential to transform the discussion of virtue
outside and within the academy is conspicuously absent from Stein scholars who often,
when they do discuss Stein’s language, word choice, and radical writing, focus instead on
its surface form. Because Stein’s writing is so striking for its time, who can blame them?
Janet Hobhouse, like other early biographers, glosses Stein’s project in “Melanctha” and
writes of “its use of dialogue, extraordinary in a work of that time for its closeness to
actual speech. . . . Significantly it was ordinary human speech, repetitive and ungainly,
unstructured by the demands of literary form” (71). Stein, as I have argued, was not
capturing “actual speech,” nor was she trying to “br[ing] the language back to life” as
Sutherland says her work “more radically than any other work of the time in English”
does (40). Rather, Stein says, perhaps coyly or smuggishly, she just did what “naturally to
[her] was natural” (“Composition” 220).
What Stein did to words wasn’t “natural”—or at the very least, it wasn’t
expected—but it was original. Similar to Sutherland’s claim that “Stein uses repetition
and dislocation to make the word bear all the meaning it has” (48), Allegra Stewart wrote
in 1957 that Stein “strained words and exerted pressure upon them, and renounced
‘names’ (nouns), and dissected grammar. Whatever she concentrated her attention upon
became isolated from all the relations in which it stood to other things” (Hoffman,
Critical 99). The relations in which words stood to other things, even subconsciously, has
become central to understanding Stein’s theories of composition. These relationships are
often called “associations,” per the psychology of William James: “She follows William
James in recognizing that words acquire meaning from the mind’s stock of associations,
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but she refuses to allow habitual patterns of association to obscure the multiple
associative contexts of words” (Levin 154). Meyer puts it more strongly:
Stein objected to association . . . on two counts. First, it distracted from the
writing by removing one’s attention from the object on the page and so
breaking one’s concentration. Second, and still more damning, it was
entirely habitual. One had no control over one’s associations—it was
hardly possible to stop them—and as such they were a sign of one’s
dependence on habit. (239-40)
Certainly Stein is indebted to the psychology of William James, as I have already
conveyed and every biographer makes explicitly clear. Lisa Ruddick goes so far as to
suggest that “‘Melanctha’ carries on a private conversation with William James. . . .
Along one of its axes, Stein’s story reads as a tribute to James’s psychological theories—
theories that despite their well-known continuities with modernist aesthetics are
nineteenth-century in their ethics. Yet at the margins of the story, other material shows
Stein already beginning to define herself against James” (12). Stein, I would like to
argue, is doing more than “beginning to define herself against James,” however, though
she certainly is, at the very least, doing so on some level. She is subverting the very
discourse James’s academy taught, both the older classical understandings of virtue and
aesthetics, as well as the scientific exploration of those virtues and natures and habits
through laboratory experiments.
But “Gertrude Stein is hard work,” Dydo reminds us, “for she challenges our
capacity to read and our expectations of what written words and sentences are, what they
do and how they do it” (12, emphasis in original). It comes as no surprise to any close
reader of her texts that the tendency of Stein scholars in recent decades focuses on her
words themselves and the sounds of those words, the placement of those words, the
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mechanics of her writing. Additionally, this trajectory is followed in linking her work to
that of William James.
Most connections between Stein and James are on the level of subconscious, the
role of habit formation, and automation. Jonathan Levin, who as his chapter title suggests
is interested in “Gertrude Stein and the Movement of Words,” describes some of William
James’s word experiments, especially the way a word can be emptied of meaning when
repeated by itself—“it is reduced to a bare sensation” (151). Linking the writing of Stein,
especially in works like “Melanctha,” to this sort of task of emptying words of meaning
sells Stein’s genius and the vastness of her project short, though even her friend Carl Van
Vechten suggested in 1914 that “She has really turned language into music, really made
its sound more important than its sense” (Curnutt 155). Certainly Van Vechten’s
description should unsettle casual readers of the text: has Stein made “sound more
important than sense”?
Perhaps what is causing the confusion between the repetition of words and their
potential loss of meaning is what Bowers calls the “slipperiness” of Stein’s words, like
“good” or “wisdom” or “wandering” in “Melanctha” (Bowers 50-54). This slipperiness is
related to her intentional style and the purpose of her work, as Levin describes well: “The
continuous present which she seeks to represent is the dynamic moment of this renewal
and transformation. Stein’s words are always in transition, foregrounding the processes
that make and remake meanings” (154). A diversity of meaning, call it the slipperiness of
words, call it ambiguity, is an intentional project of subversion and certainly does not
make the words have less meaning but more. Stein, I argue, wants more than one
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meaning to be present at the same moment; she wants conventional meanings to be
stretched, not eliminated; broadened and subverted, not ignored.
What’s more, according to Buckham, is that “[p]aradoxically, even when the
narrator employs words and structures whose meaning would not ordinarily be
interpreted as enigmatic, the meaning seems to become problematic” (65). Bowers’s
example of “good” and other words like “really” take on new meaning when we hear of
someone, for instance, being “really” married. In the early 1900s, marriage was not
something conventionally understood as being on a continuum of “real”-ness (though it
would be fascinating to know Stein’s take on the complex political and cultural moment
in which we now find the discussion of “marriage” occurring and how if she were writing
today she would subvert even those definitions being sought and established through
legislation). In “Melanctha,” simple words become loaded and difficult precisely in order
to transform their simplicity into complexity that captures the way discourse has
traditionally been limited and defined. This is no easy task, and Stein’s success does not
necessarily mean our interpretation comes without work. Buckham writes, “Melanctha is
seemingly one of the most coherent and comprehensible texts of Stein’s oeuvre, but is,
beneath the surface, a text whose meaning is extremely ambiguous. . . . [I]t is impossible
to discern any kind of autotelic meaning in Melanctha through the conventional,
‘comfortable’ methodology of searching for thematic synthesis in the text” (57).
Certainly an “autotelic meaning” is difficult in any text, and Stein’s proves more difficult
than many, but a “thematic synthesis” is precisely what I am seeking to do here in regard
to Stein’s particular use of virtue language in “Melanctha.”
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In the following chapter, I will explore “Melanctha” in more detail, especially the
way in which Stein uses the story to subvert classical understandings of virtue to
demonstrate the complexity of human character, habit, desire, and behavior.
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Chapter 4
The Whole Thing that Is Interesting:
“Melanctha,” Character, and Stein’s Subversion of Classical Virtue Theory
The composition we live in changes but essentially what happens does not
change. We inside us do not change but our emphasis and the moment in
which we live changes. That is it is never the same moment it is never the
same emphasis at any successive moment of existing.
Gertrude Stein, Lectures 195
[A]t all times Miss Stein is a conscious artist; although her material may at
first sight appear to be digressive or repetitive, she is actually presenting
human beings in their uneventful daily lives according to a carefully
wrought, fully developed conception.
Rosalind Miller, Gertrude Stein: Form and Intelligibility 46
The triangular love affair that occurred between Gertrude Stein, May Bookstaver,
and Mabel Haynes has often been linked to the plot of “Melanctha,” and some scholars
have found up to thirty-four parallels between the real and fictional stories (Q.E.D. 201).
Indeed, “Melanctha” is considered by many to be at least the third time Stein has
explored the same story line, rewriting, tweaking, and exploring the plot of a personal
experience historians know to be factual. Nearly every biographer details the complicated
truth behind the love triangle that appears in Q.E.D., Fernhurst, and “Melanctha,” three
of her earliest works, and point to the overlap of conversation snippets between the three
stories and personal correspondence of Stein, Bookstaver, and Haynes. One important
piece of the puzzle that connects these published works as well as Stein’s personal letters
has been overlooked by scholars: the discussion of virtue and vice.
Why is this significant?
The two primary reasons have already been established in the previous two
chapters: first, the “bottom nature,” or character, of human beings that fascinated Stein
from the moment she observed it in James’ laboratory, and second, Stein’s academic
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exposure to classical theories of philosophy while a philosophy major just before the turn
of the century at Harvard. Closely connected to the discussion of character and human
nature and habit is the central question of classical, especially ancient, philosophy: “What
is ‘the good’?” A second question follows from the first: “What does it mean to be a
‘good person’?”
Stein’s exposure to these ideas in an academic setting that was beginning to
grapple with the rise of psychology and physiology and scientific proofs alongside
philosophical discussions of “the good” enabled her to explore what it means to develop
character, habits, and virtue through lived experience and then articulate it through her
fiction in a way that subverts both the classical understandings of fixed character and the
scientific method of exploring what it means to be a human being, as if it were a thing to
observe and catalog rather than experience.
First, we turn to the classical definitions of virtue and vice in an attempt to
highlight the complexity—and success—of Stein’s project.
Though the earliest conceptions of virtue involved only the notion of excellence
more generally, by the time of Plato and Aristotle, “virtue” was beginning to convey a
moral dimension. For Aristotle, in particular, to speak of virtue was to speak of ethics,
that is, moral habits. To be virtuous is, in this understanding, to have a disposition to do,
think, and act a particular good way.
In Plato’s Republic, one of the few works in which he posits answers and
definitions, Plato delineates the four virtues that have become known as the cardinal
virtues of western culture: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. They are called
“cardinal” virtues in that they “direct” all action. According to Plato, the soul is tripartite,
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made up of reason, the appetites, and thumos (thumos is difficult to translate, but it is
sometimes called the “spirited” part or the will). And these parts of the soul are intimately
linked to the virtues: the first virtue, wisdom, is what is exhibited when the rational part
of the soul is in good working order; the second, courage, appears when the person has a
good thumos; temperance is the condition of having the right relationship between reason
and the appetites; and justice is had when reason controls the appetites using the thumos.
Perhaps the most significant point about virtue for Plato that will be important in
discussing Stein’s reinterpretation and subversion of virtue, character, and habit in
“Melanctha” is that virtue is primarily intellectual: to know the good is to do the good.
Aristotle, primarily in Nicomachean Ethics, further articulates a conception of
virtue focused on character and habituation. Like Plato’s conception of knowing the good
being synonymous with doing the good, for Aristotle it would be ridiculous to conceive
of a virtuous person not doing the virtuous act in any given situation; the difference from
Plato simply comes that it is not a person’s intellect but their “firm, unshakeable
character” and “practical wisdom” from which the virtuous action stems (Nic. Eth. bk. 2,
ch. 4 and bk. 6, ch. 13). Later in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines practical wisdom
as knowing how to apply virtue; the wise person cannot choose not to do the wise act.
Additionally, if a person has practical wisdom, according to Aristotle, then it is necessary
that such a person has all of the virtues.
A final Aristotelian description might be helpful for thinking about character
types in “Melanctha.” For Aristotle, all people fall into one of four categories: vicious,
incontinent, continent, or virtuous. The vicious person has no recognition what good
actions (that is, virtuous actions) are and therefore cannot do those actions; the
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incontinent person knows what the virtuous deed is but lacks practical wisdom and thus
does not do the action; the continent person knows the virtuous action and generally does
it, but doesn’t want to and doesn’t get pleasure from being virtuous; and the virtuous
person knows the virtuous action, does it, wants to, and, what’s more, likes it.
Taking character and classical virtue as two lenses—or a single, double-thick
lens—through which to read and understand Stein’s insistence on words like “wisdom”
alters significantly our interpretation of the text. Perhaps because it is so often paired with
“wandering,” as in “wandering after wisdom,” more often than not, in discussions of
Three Lives, Melanctha’s “wisdom” takes on a sexual, carnal, even illicit shade. Rather
than analyzing “wisdom” within the text or from the point of view of Stein’s potential
subversion of what it means to be a “wise” person or act “wisely,” discussions tend to be
limited to the obvious euphemism for sexual awakening (see, for example, Bowers 38 or
Mellow 74). To be fair, however, a few explore Stein’s more complex thematic at play in
her use of the word. John Carlos Rowe notes, “Stein gathers together in the term
‘wandering’ all the different affective, sexual, linguistic, and cognitive practices that
cannot be controlled or understood by ruling-class reason” (233). And Lisa Ruddick
points to another dimension of “wandering”—that the word is not “original” to Stein at
all, pointing instead to Stein’s indebtedness to modern psychology and to William James
once again. James “uses the term mind-wandering, or wandering attention, to describe
such a receptiveness to sensation” (Ruddick 18). These readings lead to interesting and
even fruitful interpretations of the text, but, as we will see below, exploring Stein’s
“hazily defined wisdom” (Ruddick 32) in terms of its relation to classical understandings
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of the four cardinal virtues has the potential to subvert those very virtues at the heart of
western culture.
In discussing “Melanctha” in detail for a close reading, dividing the content into
three sections can make it more manageable: the first section focuses on Melanctha’s
own narrative, especially her upbringing and wandering, while the second section
foregrounds Jeff’s narrative, as Stein moves us into his thoughts, feelings, and struggles
in relating to and fighting against Melanctha. It is worth noting that the precise moment
readers move into the mind of Jeff Campbell is not clear to us; Jeff and Melanctha have
long, rambling conversations while Melanctha’s ill mother lays upstairs, and at some
point the “power” shifts. Melanctha leaves the room, and we find ourselves alone with
Jeff. In the third and final section of the story, as Lew Welch writes, “The story
continues, but in my opinion it becomes less interesting” (49). Stein moves back to
Melanctha’s narrative, in time for her tragic love affair and startlingly sudden death.
A simple “map” of “Melanctha” that can be traced along this same tripartite
division of the narrative could easily be character-based: moving from Melanctha to Jeff
and then back to Melanctha. Another division that maps onto the story as split into these
three sections within the narrative could be based on virtue, moving from wisdom to
courage and then to foolishness, commonly understood as the opposite of wisdom. But a
more complex tripartite map of “Melanctha” should include all of these, as well as birth
and death themes—the repetition of the birth of Rose’s child, for example, which is a
moment of literal repetition in the text that sends a signal to readers to pay attention. If
readers are perceptive to the virtue narrative, then the child’s birth and death emphasize
the contrast between Melanctha’s wisdom in the first section and her lack of wisdom in
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the third section. Indeed, the narrator tells us six times in five pages that love has made
her “foolish” (155-59).
Presenting a case for the presence and prevalence of virtue—at least a thematics
of virtue—in the narrative will set the stage for an analysis of Stein’s complex project of
weaving together modern character types, human nature, and Platonic and Aristotelian
conceptions of virtue, which Stein powerfully subverts.
The first of the classical virtues that Stein offers to readers comes in the middle of
a list of less-than-flattering personality traits: “The young Melanctha did not love her
father and her mother, and she had a break neck courage, and a tongue that could be very
nasty” (63). Without context, “courage” hardly seems admirable in this case. But as
Melanctha’s childhood unfolds, courage as a virtue does emerge. Two sentences later, we
read again, “Melanctha Herbert had always had a break neck courage” (63). Such a
character trait comes in handy, for instance, when we learn that her “breakneck courage”
helps her resist her father’s abuse (66).
Stein’s innovation comes when she splits “courage” apart in the story, separating
out some sort of innate character description from a person’s actions in particular
moments. As Melanctha seeks experience, we read, “She knew she was not getting what
she so badly wanted, but with all her break neck courage Melanctha here was a coward”
(68). While maintaining the centrality of courage to Melanctha’s character description,
Stein describes her as a “coward,” that is, one with no courage. The important word in the
sentence is “here,” however: “Melanctha here was a coward” (my emphasis). Courage—
and virtue more generally—may be innate, as Melanctha’s is, but it can be lacking in
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particular moments of action. Stein splits apart human nature and human action, which
has significant implications for a more classical understanding of virtue.
A similar bifurcation occurs in Stein’s presentation of wisdom in this first section:
“Melanctha with all her inborn intense wisdom was really very ignorant of evil” (66).
Conventional definitions tell us that a wise person cannot be ignorant, especially not of
evil. Yet on the following page, Stein writes, “In these next years Melanctha learned
many ways that lead to wisdom. She learned the ways, and dimly in the distance she saw
wisdom” (67). If Melanctha had “inborn intense wisdom,” how can it now be distanced
from her, something she must learn? Stein continues to hint at the interplay of two types
of wisdom, one a character trait and the other “world wisdom” (70). Melanctha, though
wise, “wandered on the edge of wisdom” (70). As the plot of this first section moves
forward, wisdom becomes something to be taught: Melanctha would soon meet Jane
Harden, a “roughened woman,” “who had wisdom” and also “vital courage” (73). The
potential of virtue to be taught, like a skill, comes up again in the second section of the
text, when Jeff seeks Melanctha’s wisdom.
Something else early on in the first part of the story also helps to complicate the
virtue thematic: “Melanctha always loved and wanted peace and gentleness and goodness
and all her life for herself poor Melanctha could only find new ways to be in trouble”
(65). A version of this sentence echoes throughout “Melanctha”; Stein uses the mantra to
suggest something about Melanctha, but what is it? A close reading focusing on virtue
might work through this in two different ways: firstly, that the disconnect between action
and outcome is an example of “injustice” in the story (if so, this repeat construction is
possibly the only identifiable appearance of (in)justice in “Melanctha”); or secondly, that
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the disconnect between Melanctha’s intentions and her actions—if “find[ing] new ways
to be in trouble” is read as “action” on her part—illustrates a lack of virtue. Remember
that the virtuous person according to Aristotle not only knows what the virtuous action is
and wants to do it, but also does it and enjoys doing it. Regardless of the interpretation we
choose—Stein leaves it ambiguous—the complexity of the role of virtue in a single
sentence helps to show the complexity of virtue in the story as a whole and the way Stein
is subverting what virtue is. In her narrative, living virtuously and being virtuous become
a dichotomy.
In the first section of the story, Stein depicts courage as a double-sided virtue, but
the section then moves beyond courage to thoroughly develop a thematic of wisdom; the
second section starts with tension between fear and courage, as Jeff remembers how
Melanctha accused him of being afraid of “losing being good” (87). Cowardice becomes
the central image of the section, a refrain readers cannot ignore: “he did not want to be a
coward” (91); “Somehow he was always afraid when he was to go to her, and yet he
made himself very certain that here he would not be a coward” (95); “He knew he was
very right to be angry, he knew he really had not been a coward” (102). But once again,
Stein offers us clues that there are two types of cowardice, cowardice of character and
cowardice of action. Jeff says to Melanctha, “with you, I have never been a coward. . . I
don’t like to be a coward to you, Melanctha” (103, my emphasis). His character remains
solid (in a letter, Jeff writes, “I don’t change, never” [104]), yet he confesses to
inconsistencies of action: “Perhaps I was a coward” (107).
Additionally, Jeff and Melanctha’s most strident verbal argument in this section is
over a virtue: the distinction between courage and bravery (117-119). While Jeff doesn’t
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think it matters what a person’s motivation is—if a man is on the bottom of a fistpounding, it doesn’t matter how he got there, he says—but Melanctha disagrees: “It do
make all the difference the kind of way anybody is made to do things game” (119).
Intention of action matters to Melanctha, and what is significant, at this point in the
narrative, she is characterized as wise in both of Stein’s senses of virtue—character and
action.
Though Jeff’s character “do[esn’t] change, never,” he continues to seek
Melanctha’s wisdom in this section, asking her to tell him what to do: “Can’t you help
me to any way, to make it all straight for me, Melanctha, so I know right and real what it
is I should be acting. You see, Melanctha, I don’t want always to be a coward with you, if
I only could know certain what was the right way for me to be acting” (112). She answers
strongly, “No, Jeff, dear, I certainly can’t help you” (113). This exchange will figure
significantly in weaving Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of virtue being unteachable
and unlearnable into the plot of “Melanctha.”
Eventually Jeff and Melanctha wander apart, and the third section of the story
starts, it appears to the reader, with the re-introduction of Rose, with her “simple, selfish
wisdom” (another complexity of virtue that seems dissonant with conventional
definitions); but then the story backs up and mentions Jeff again briefly in order to reveal
that “now Jeff Campbell had real wisdom in him” (154). But since the unlikable Jem
Richards is also introduced to us as having “real wisdom” (154), Stein casts doubt on
Jeff’s being better off than before he met Melanctha. As the chart above illustrates, the
primary virtue described in the third and final section of “Melanctha” is actually a vice:
Melanctha’s love has made her foolish (155-59).
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As a narrative, “Melanctha” is front-loaded with discussions of virtue; once Stein
establishes her modus operandi, she does not belabor the point. In the first section of the
story, the most significant virtue themes for our discussion of Platonic and Aristotelian
virtue is Stein’s introduction and of the dual nature of virtue—the difference between
virtue as a character trait and virtue as action—and her conception of the potential to
learn or teach virtue. This significant subversion of classical understanding of virtue
questions millennia-old assumptions about the human experience and character. The
second section of “Melanctha” further emphasizes the question of “learned” virtue as Jeff
seeks “wisdom” from Melanctha and whether or not it is possible to learn to be wise.
These threads will become central to our discussion of ancient virtue.
As has, I hope, been made clear thus far, Stein’s use of virtue language in
“Melanctha” is significant and often enough that its presence can not be ignored. But how
is it possible to offer a reading of “Melanctha” that incorporates language from the virtue
tradition and makes claims about the ways Stein may or may not be intentionally
adapting classical definitions for her purposes as a modern writer? Michael Trask, in
“Making Do with Gertrude Stein,” suggests that formalist interpretations of Stein’s work
have left little room for more thematic interpretations, such as the one I am seeking to do
here. Trask writes,
critics have made it hard to accommodate the idea that Stein’s work might
have interpretive value at the thematic level. Though able Stein critics
have explored the connection between her work and James’s, for instance,
they have viewed it largely in formal terms, nimbly positing how Jamesian
habit is transformed into the arithmetic-like prose of Stein’s texts.
[Specific themes] have thus proved hard to read in Stein; they don’t fit
neatly into the abstractive calculus of most Stein criticism because they
embody a sort of obdurate content, a sheer presence that doesn’t
necessarily ‘mean’ anything. (90)
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The question that haunts this research is whether the “sheer presence” of virtue in
“Melanctha” necessarily “means” anything. Is it possible to use the vocabulary already in
existence from Plato and Aristotle to explore what Stein might be doing? I am arguing
that yes, it is possible. And not just possible, but important in highlighting the radical
nature of Stein’s subverting work on human character. Let’s consider how.
Regarding the struggle in the text between innate or habituated virtue and the
possibility of “learning” to be virtuous: since virtue cannot be taught as far as the ancients
were concerned, Stein’s determination to convey the process of gaining “wisdom”
throughout the story—Melanctha and Jeff seek it; Jane and Melanctha teach it—could
introduce some interesting conversations. One thing Stein succeeds in doing—possibly
her most significant innovation on Platonic and Aristotelian virtue theory—is separating
out the virtuous character trait from virtuous action. As a result, the already and innately
wise Melanctha can still wander after wisdom and the already courageous Melanctha can
be cowardly when faced with a difficult situation. This, of course, is impossible for both
Plato (for whom to know good is to do good) and Aristotle (for whom to be virtuous is to
act virtuously). Stein’s bifurcation of virtue into two parts—actions that may or may not
correspond to character traits—not only subverts traditional understandings but requires
follow-up questions that are, to some extent, unanswerable: what, then, does it mean to be
a virtuous person? What, then, does it mean for an action to be virtuous? How can
rightness and wrongness ever be established?
There is a fluidity to Stein’s articulation of virtue in “Melanctha” that frees the
potential of her characters, even as they seem stuck on a treadmill of struggle and
confusion until their deaths. Significantly, Stein offers a subtitle to Melanctha’s story,
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something the other two “lives” of Three Lives don’t require. “Melanctha: Each One As
She May” would be a different story if Stein had called it “Melanctha: Each One As She
Is.” The word “may” is empowering, allowing room for growth or decline, based on the
actions of “each one.” By separating out virtuous action from virtuous characters, Stein
subverts how virtue has been defined and understood since Plato and Aristotle.
Aristotle’s “unity of the virtues” thesis establishes the impossibility of having one
virtue, like practical wisdom, but lacking the others. The first and third sections of Stein’s
story, that is, the parts that focus on Melanctha’s development and then demise, are
interesting to hold up and consider with this in mind. Melanctha is described as having a
sense of innate wisdom but lacking in world wisdom. Ignoring our inability to reconcile
that bifurcation with Aristotle’s conception of virtue, fast-forward to the final section of
the story, when Melanctha falls in love with Jem, the villain who is also supposedly wise;
her love makes her foolish, the narrator tells us over and over and over—six times to be
exact. She is wise, seeks wisdom, teaches wisdom, and then dies a foolish woman. Is
Melanctha virtuous? The question, for Aristotle, would itself be nonsensical. Stein
intentionally breaks away from any sort of unity-of-the-virtues arguments in order to
present a more complex set of characters who are themselves in the process of developing
character. Stein’s subversion of Aristotle’s theory introduces a powerful way of
imagining and describing human nature that serves to break apart the heady academic
discourse of classical virtue ethics, which remains in the theoretical realm, not the lived
one.
Aristotle’s vicious-incontinent-continent-virtuous continuum may also offer
insight into reading Stein’s work. Though Aristotle’s four types of people don’t directly
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apply to “Melanctha,” thinking about these categories in terms of character types has
potential here because, as we have seen, Stein herself thought in terms of character types;
it was the recognition of the “bottom nature” of her experimental subjects that helped
prompt her exploration of character, virtue, and habit as I’ve articulated it here. I am
particularly interested in the character of Jeff during the second section of the story,
especially at the moment he asks Melanctha to tell him what the right thing to do is
(which is followed by her refusal). Aristotle’s vicious person, too, cannot discern what
the virtuous action is. In fact, though it seems counter to the modern conception of right
and wrong, in which ignorance often is thought to excuse bad behavior, Aristotle
considers a vicious person to be the “worst” of the four types: such people are not even
aware that they are doing wrong, which places them the furthest away from virtue. Jeff,
though by the end reportedly has become wise, falls into this “vicious” category. Readers
who disagree must, at the very least, confess that Jeff does lack practical wisdom, which
puts him in the incontinent camp, only slightly “better” off than the vicious person. Since
Jeff is most often conflated with Stein as an alter-ego of sorts, it is difficult to make sense
of this shade of meaning. And though Jeff supposedly gains “real wisdom” (145) by the
end of the narrative, only a few pages later readers learn that Jem, too, is described as
having “real wisdom” (154) and Jem, we know, is not virtuous.
I’ve tried to show that many critics have described Stein’s deliberate use of
language, of “breaking apart” grammar, sentences, and words, as a way of tearing down
structures of perception and laying it all bare. While such criticism has its place, this is
not always helpful and can, potentially, be limiting to our understanding of Stein’s larger
project of subverting the discourse of virtue and vice, of character, of human nature.
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What I am arguing is that rather than laying language “bare,” Stein is muddying the
waters while, at the same time, allowing them to run clear as they continue on around the
circular globe. Mabel Dodge, a friend of Stein’s, published an essay in 1913 ardently
supporting Stein’s project. She writes of Stein’s work as “breaking” roads:
Many roads are being broken—what a wonderful word—‘broken’! And
out of the shattering and petrifaction of today—up from the cleavage and
the disintegration —we will see order emerging tomorrow. Is it so difficult
to remember that life at birth is always painful and rarely lovely? How
strange it is to think that the rough-hewn trail of today will become
tomorrow the path of least resistance, over which the average will drift
with all the ease and serenity of custom. . . . We can but praise the high
courage of the road breakers. . . . (Hoffman, Critical 30-31)
Though hesitant to disagree with Dodge’s endorsement—we can’t miss her use of a
virtue-laden word “courage” to describe the work that Stein has done as a “road
breaker”—I would characterize Stein’s work through “Melanctha” more as repainting the
lines on the road of virtue theory, or redrawing a map to a place that is already there, the
“place” of human experience, rather than breaking the road into pieces for it to be rebuilt
by somebody else. Certainly Stein “breaks” in a new style, but I am not convinced that
she is doing much more than trying to capture human experience—the virtuous and the
vicious—as she conceives it, witnesses it, experiences it, though that in itself is a
monumental task. It is a task requiring the subversion of what is familiar, of the discourse
that limits and shapes the stories we tell ourselves about what it means to be virtuous,
and, at the risk of sounding grander than need be, what it means to be human.
Stein is exposing the complexity of lived experience, and one of the ways she is
doing that in “Melanctha” is by conversing in the language of classical virtue theory. But
she’s not coloring between the lines, one could say, to introduce yet another metaphor to
an already metaphoric topic. Stein’s understandings are more complex than the classical
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definitions allow for; a whole paper could be written, I am sure, on how her life at the
turn of the century and her exposure to the new scientific discourse within academic
philosophy and psychology placed in her a particular milieu to rethink these conceptions
of virtue and identity. In these pages, I have only begun to scratch the surface,
articulating the differences between human nature and human action that I see Stein
delineating in “Melanctha,” and the basis I find for these arguments in Stein’s education
at Harvard, Stein’s specificity of word choice, and Stein’s theories about character and
habit.
The virtuous person, for Stein, can act unvirtuously, as we have seen. Human
beings are complex and inconsistent, as our lived experience has already taught us. The
more interesting question to ponder, perhaps, is whether for Stein human beings can be
anything other than inconsistent. To some extent, Stein has revealed, we are all the same:
when it comes to human beings, “all that there [is] inside them, not so much by the actual
words they [say] or the thoughts they [have] but the movement of their thoughts and
words,” they are “endlessly the same and endlessly different” (Lectures 138).
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